Raising a big tent: Internal party composition and leadership selectorate expansion

Chase B. Meyer*, Brett N. Odom

University of Georgia, Department of Political Science, 104 Baldwin Hall, Athens, 30602, Georgia

Abstract

The trend amongst many parties toward the inclusion of rank-and-file members in the leadership selection process has often been attributed to opposition status and electoral defeat. However, these explanations are typical events for parties and hardly seem sufficient for party elites to willingly cede their authority over the selection of party leaders. This paper proposes that the electoral regionalization of the party contributes to the decision to expand the leadership selectorate. In the event a party is defeated to an extent in which their support is reduced to its regional base, this situation necessitates the bringing in of new voices to avoid further marginalization. This paper finds that regionalization plays a significant role in the decision of parties to expand leadership selectorates and that the role of opposition status and electoral setbacks have been overstated.

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1. Introduction

In 2001, for the first time in the more than century long history of the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party, Tory activists and members across Britain voted to determine the leader of their party. Previously, this decision had been reserved only to Tory members of Parliament. The change in rules, on its surface, seems to be a remarkable diffusion of power by party elites to the grassroots. Yet this willing reduction in elite power was hardly unique. The Tories had joined the ranks of a sizeable collection of parties throughout the Commonwealth which had adopted similar practices. Beginning with the 1919 establishment of a leadership convention by the Liberal Party of Canada, more than a dozen parties in the Westminster system have adopted leadership election rules that include at least some level of involvement in the selection of the party leader.

While this democratization trend of leadership selection has been noticed by many scholars (LeDuc, 2001; Kenig, 2009; Wauters, 2010), and has coincided with a democratization of candidate selection (Bille, 2001), it is not universal amongst parliamentary democracies. The major parties of Australia and New Zealand have largely shied away from such delegations of power. Fianna Fáil, the party which has ruled Ireland for much of the republican era, still reserves the leadership decisions to its parliamentary party. Many of the explanatory factors proposed in the existing research, being in opposition (Courtney, 1995) and the loss of elections and power (Cross and Blais, 2012a), are almost certainly contributors to the decision by parties to expand leadership selectorates. Yet these are common experiences to all parties in parliamentary systems. As explanations, they fail to establish the logic behind the willing transfer of power from elites to the membership.

Cross and Blais (2012a), in their study of leadership elections, suggest an important possible explanation: selectorate expansion will occur when a party has become regionalized and must reach out to a more diverse set of voices. This paper seeks to systematically test that explanation through a study of the same national political parties first explored by Cross and Blais (2012a). These parties are from five nations in the Westminster tradition during the post-war period: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. When a party has suffered a magnitude of defeat that leaves it shut out of large swaths of the country, its elites will agree to transfer some of their leadership selection prerogatives in order to include input from those regions of the country not represented in the parliamentary party and reinvigorate the party grassroots. In essence, they become willing to cede some internal party power to ensure the revival of the party and improve their chances of regaining governmental power. Thus it is not mere electoral defeat or occupation of the opposition benches that propels selectorate rule changes, but rather it is the...
result of a magnitude of defeat that imperils the future of the party by reducing the party to its regional base.

2. Literature review

2.1. Rule changes, opposition, and electoral setbacks

Political parties in developed democracies have seen an increasing trend toward the democratization of their leadership selection processes. This has been most pronounced in the developed democracies of the Westminster-style parliamentary systems. However, it is not a foregone conclusion that parties will take this path. Australian parties, in particular, have been resistant to giving members a vote in leadership elections (Cross and Blais, 2012a). Furthermore, consensus and consociational parliamentary democracies have seen an uneven push toward intra-party democratization, with parties in Belgium making the change while Northern Irish parties lag behind (Wauters, 2013; Matthews, 2013).

Scholars have principally looked at two key causes for the democratization of the leadership process: opposition status and electoral setbacks. Cross and Blais (2012a, 2012b) look at individual cases of selectorate expansion and find both of these factors to be common denominators, in line with the conclusions of several scholars (Deschouwer, 1992; Panebianco, 1988; Courtney, 1995). Parties included members in the leadership when they were in opposition and after electoral defeat. The same pattern has been found in the transition from leadership conventions to leadership elections in Canadian provinces (Cross, 1996). In short, “winners seldom innovate,” only losers do (Frantzich, 1989).

A special case of parties that are typically on the opposition benches, niche parties, often seem inclined to adopt more democratic rules. Niche parties have different agendas and strategies (Wagner, 2012) and thus may not respond to devastating elections in the same way that mainstream parties would (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow, 2008). Furthermore, their electoral situations tend to be somewhat at the mercy of the actions of mainstream parties (Meguid, 2005, 2008). These smaller parties tend to adopt more democratic leadership selection rules early in their existence as they sit on the opposition benches or before they can even enter parliament (Cross and Blais, 2012a).

2.2. Effectiveness of rule changes

Democratization of the selectorate is not in and of itself a goal for elites. The goal is to broaden the appeal of the party in order to gain more votes and more seats in the next election, and ultimately to move from opposition to being in government. A more democratic leadership selection process, though, does not inherently mean a more democratic election. Certainly the expectations and the actual results can differ. The establishment of an electoral college by Labour in the UK was expected to strengthen the left of the party; instead the right wing of the party emerged dominant (Denham, 2012).

Kenig (2009) found that while expansion may increase the number of candidates in leadership elections, the elections themselves tend to become less competitive. Although, anecdotally, even that conclusion is in doubt. As Denham (2009) observes, the four candidates who stood in the 2005 British Conservative leadership election would likely have stood regardless of whether the parliamentary party or the membership had the final say. Other implications of the expansion are slightly more representative and accountable party leaders (Cross and Pilet, 2014).

Beyond just expansion in the leadership context, the same process in terms of candidate selection for constituencies can increase membership participation or (Hopkins, 2001), if taken too far, weaken party cohesiveness and increase factionalism (Hazan, 1997; Pennings and Hazan, 2001). A further risk to party elites comes from the dramatic increase of “non-traditional” candidates running for leadership elections when the selectorate is expanded; specifically candidates with little to no parliamentary experience (Kenig, 2007). From the perspective of elites, selectorate expansion clearly has potential costs that should make parliamentarians hesitate before any such change.

2.3. Regionalization

While there is an abundance of statistical and anecdotal evidence supporting the role opposition and electoral defeat play in a party’s decision making, these explanations are hardly satisfactory. All parties experience ups and downs—defeats and opposition are a natural part of the life of political parties. Yet not all parties choose to expand the selectorates that choose their leaders. Many parties, such as Ireland’s Fianna Fail and New Zealand’s National Party, have never formerly included rank-and-file members in the leadership process. Reasonably, therefore, these factors could be considered necessary but not sufficient conditions.

The internal debates when several parties chose to include members in the process suggest a possible motivation. The parliamentary party does not necessarily have confidence in the ability of the rank and file to make such decisions. British Tories in fact wanted to revert back to the old selection system after the members chose the disastrous Ian Duncan Smith as leader and acclaimed his successor Michael Howard to prevent another membership ballot (Quinn, 2012). Yet democratization could not be rolled back.

In two key cases, the emergence of leadership conventions in Canadian parties and the move to include members in Tory leadership elections in Britain, scholars found that many leaders believed their defeated, regionalized parties needed to include more voices from important yet underrepresented parts of the country in the leadership process. If not, they worried, it would endanger the parties’ efforts to appeal to those regions in the future (Courtney, 1995; Denham and O’Hara, 2008). After the 1917 federal election in Canada, support for the Liberals had largely collapsed across Canada except in the party’s bastion of Quebec, as shown in Fig. 1. With anglophone Canadians drastically underrepresented in the party caucus, leaders feared that leaving the decision of the party leadership of the francophone-dominated parliamentary party would exasperate the party’s bleak situation and thus established conventions to include party members from marginalized regions (Courtney, 1995).

The British Tories suffered a similar fate in the 1997 general election. Battered by the Labour landslide, the Tories looked at their shrunken caucus and understood that the party could not seriously speak to large sections of the country. The historical record shows this was an explicit concern:

“In particular the small number of Conservative MPs who survived the 1997 landslide (165) and their geographical concentration in South, East, and rural England, led to calls to widen the franchise to ensure that members in Scotland, Wales, and urban areas were represented” (Denham and O’Hara, 2008, 25–26).

Furthermore, the MPs believed, offering members a say in the leadership could be an incentive that would attract new members to the party (Denham and O’Hara, 2008). Similar concerns were raised when the United Kingdom’s Liberal Party made the move to a one-member-one-vote system and during the Unite the Right movement in Canada (Quinn, 2012; Marland and Flanagan, 2013).
3. Theory and hypotheses

These events suggest that it is not merely electoral defeat but a certain magnitude of defeat that pushes the party elite to democratize the leadership selection process. The elites have to weigh the costs of maintaining their existing power within the party with their party’s future electoral prospects. As suggested by Cross and Blais (2012a) and other scholars, the elites will be more inclined to include members in the leadership selection process when the party has been reduced to their regional base and feel their ability to continue as a major national party is threatened. The elites, aware that their regionalization limits the capacity of the parliamentary party to represent all parts of the country, will reach out to the membership to compensate for its shortcomings.

This expansion both increases input in the leadership process while creating a new incentive for members to join and participate. It makes the party more appealing, a vital requirement for parties in such dire straits. The new members in turn become a source of votes, funds, and prospective candidates for the party (Scarrow, 1994). Thus a poor election would not be enough to convince party elites to democratize their selection process, but a poor election in which the party has a reduced national presence and would need to revitalize itself would cause party elites to reach out to members through democratization.

**Hypothesis 1.** As a party becomes more regionalized in terms of its electoral support, it is more likely to expand its leadership selectorate.

In addition, scholarship suggests several necessary conditions. Whether parties at the time of an expansion were in opposition, had suffered an electoral defeat, or were new have all been suggested as important conditions for greater inclusion of party members in the process (Cross and Blais, 2012a).

**Hypothesis 2.** When a party is in opposition, it is more likely to expand its leadership selectorate.

**Hypothesis 3.** When a party has suffered an electoral defeat, it is more likely to expand its leadership selectorate.

**Hypothesis 4.** New parties are more likely to expand their leadership selectorate than established parties.

4. Data and methods

To test these hypotheses we use a binary logistic regression model to examine expansion of the leadership selectorate for the major political parties in the five countries of our study in the period after World War II: United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia (a full list of parties from each country can be found in Appendix A). For our purposes, the unit of analysis for this model is party-electoral cycle wherein each party has an observation that corresponds to the electoral cycle preceded by a given election.

The dependent variable is *Selectorate Expansion*, coded as 1 if an election was followed by an expansion of that party’s leadership selectorate and a 0 if there was no expansion following an election (derived from Table 3.2 from Cross and Blais, 2012a). Thus we code a party as having changed their leadership selectorate rules to be more inclusive of the grassroot supporters in response to the previous election. While there are many different ways parties can give the grassroots more say in leadership choices (such as using delegates or giving votes to all members) any time the leadership selectorate is expanded in anyways to give more power to party members it is coded as an expansion.

Take for example, the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party. In 1995 the Progressive Conservatives fully expanded their leadership selectorate to give their grassroots supporters a voice in leadership choices. While this change came a full two years after Canada’s previous national election in 1993 it is considered a response to the 1993 election. Each of the incidents selectorate expansion in the data set are listed in Table 1 below.

In order to test our main hypothesis, however, we need to measure a party’s regionalization. We use three measures to determine to what extent a party has been reduced to its regional

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1 For a list of regions for each country, please see Appendix B.
base. First, having calculated the proportion of party seats from each region, we calculated the standard deviation of these proportions (Seats Standard Deviation). The higher the standard deviation, the less even the distribution of seats across the nation as a whole and the more concentrated the party’s seats will be. Take for example the National Party of Australia. The 2001 election resulted in the National Party winning 13 total seats, over 53% of these seats were won in New South Wales, nearly 31% were won in Queensland, and 15% in Victoria, while 0 seats were won in Australia’s other regions. This resulted in a high standard deviation for the National Party, indicating their support was not spread out and was clustered in a few areas. That same year the Australian Labour Party was not nearly as regionalized and had widespread support throughout all of Australia and was not dependent on just one or two regions for the bulk of their seats. Thus, the standard deviation of the proportion of total seats won from each of the regions is one method to measure if a party has become regionalized.

A second measure is to use the highest regional seat proportion (Highest Regional Proportion). The higher the proportion of seats, the greater the concentration of seats in a single region will be. For both measures, a positive coefficient would suggest support for the regionalization hypothesis. For the National Party of Australia in 2001 this would be 53.85%, which is the amount of the seat total they gained from New South Wales. The larger this value the more a party is reliant on one single region, while the smaller the value the more spread out a party’s support is around the country.

While these measures capture regionalism well, another way to measure regionalism is to weight the standard deviation of seats by the amount of seats in each region. Gaining little support from Tasmania is not the same for parties as gaining little support from New South Wales due to the vast disparity in the amount of seats. By weighting the data based on the number of seats in each region, regional disparities can accounted for. To calculate this variable, Weighted Seats Standard Deviation, a party’s proportion from each region is multiplied by the percentage of the Parliament’s total number of seats from that region before the standard deviation is taken for the entire party.

Again, this can be illustrated using the National Party of Australia. In 2001, 30.79% of the National Party’s seats came from Queensland, but Queensland only accounted for 18% of the total seats in the Australian House of Representatives. Therefore we multiplied the two values (0.3079 × 0.18) for a new weighted total and repeated this process for each region in Australia. This new value measures for regionalization accounts for the variations in size of the various regions that compose the standard deviation.2

Other variables included in our model are controls that might also account for why a party might expand their leadership selectorates as suggested by other scholars. These variables include a dummy variable for whether a party is currently in the Opposition (Opposition) or not as well as the total number of years a party has remained in Opposition (Length of Opposition). Lost Power is a dummy variable indicating whether the party had lost the most recent election and moved from being in Government to being in the Opposition.

Other control variables indicate if the party had undergone any changes during the election cycle that could account for changes in party rules. This includes Merger, in which a party merges with another political party, and New Party, in which the political party was just created during the election cycle. We also control for the party’s overall percentage of seats in Parliament (Percent Seats in Parliament), as well as changes in the party’s overall percentage of seats in Parliament over each election cycle (Election Result).

If leadership rule changes are an effort to rebuild and expand the appeal of a party, there is an important and well known alternative to changes in the party rules: changing the party leader (Cross and Blais, 2012; Quinn, 2012). To control for whether or not parties have made other efforts to rebuild their party, there is a variable for Leadership Change, which is a binary variable for whether or not the party changed leader during the electoral cycle.

The last two controls account for the different types of political parties. A dummy variable for Niche Party is used to account for the unique situation of these and their tendency to respond to electoral setbacks differently than mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2006). For the purposes of this paper, the definition supplied by Adams et al. (2006) will be used, which describes niche parties as those outside the “mainstream or catch-all parties such as Labor, Socialist, Social Democratic, Liberal, Conservative, and Christian Democratic parties.” This definition of niche parties covers the agrarian National Party of Australia and the environmental Green Party of Ireland in our sample.

Finally, there is some historical evidence that intraparty democratization can be a function of progressive movements, as seen with the development of direct primaries in the United States (Ware, 2002). Therefore, the ideological position of political parties is controlled for by using the Comparative Manifesto Project’s scoring of the overall Left-Right position of each party’s policy program (Volkens et al., 2014). The CMP codes the policy programs of dozens of parties by creating a left-right index (ranging from –100 to 100) based on what policies the party has chosen to emphasis during a given election cycle. A list of descriptive statistics for the independent variables can be seen in Table 2.

5. Results

Based on the data, there is good reason to believe that a detailed statistical analysis will support a regionalization hypothesis. To test this proposal, Table 3 provides the average amount of regionalization that occurred when parties did and did not expand their leadership selectorates. Using our three measures of regionalization we compare the average amount of regionalization for the instances of leadership selectorate expansion and when leadership selectorates remain the same. Looking at when parties have expanded their selectorates, there is a higher level of regionalization for all three measures of regionalization. Thus, Table 3 shows that, on average, leadership selectorates were more likely to occur

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Table 1: Incidents of leadership selectorate expansion by country and party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party (Year)</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Liberals (1976); SDP (1981); Labour (1981); Liberal Democrats (1988); Conservative (1998)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Fianna Fáil (None); Labour (1989); Greens (2001) Fine Gael (2004); PD (2004);</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Liberal (1919*, 1990); PC (1927*, 1995); NDP (1961); Conservative (2003)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Labour (None); Nationals (None)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Labor (None); Liberal (None); National (None)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not included in model.
when regionalization levels were high. This finding suggests that regionalization has some impact on parties deciding to expand their leadership selectorates.

To more thoroughly test whether being reduced to their regional base is enough incentive for party elites to give power to the grassroots, we employ logistic regression with standard errors clustered by party. As the results in Table 4 below show, the major political parties in the five countries of the analysis do democratize their leadership selection rules in response to an electoral result in which they have been reduced to just their regional base. This finding is found with all three versions of our independent variable measuring regionalism. Based on these statistical results, there appears to be support for the first hypothesis.

The marginal effects plots in Appendix C illustrate this relationship. Figures C1–C3 show a clear upward trajectory along the range of the different variables of regionalization. It should be noted that while the size of the 95% confidence intervals greatly increase along the plot it is not surprising given the limited number of selectorate expansions in the data set (fifteen out of two hundred and eighty-eight observations). However, for each of the three models, there is a general increase in probability as the value of the regionalization variable increases. Once again, this finding is in line with the expectations of the first hypothesis.

Importantly, it should be noted that the variables Opposition, Length of Opposition, and Lost Power are not statistically significant, nor are they close to approaching any level of significance. This finding disputes the notion expressed in the second and third hypotheses that merely losing an election and becoming the opposition causes parties to expand their selectorate. While these hypotheses are not supported by the data, we are not prepared to say that they have absolutely no effect. After all, of the fifteen rule changes that expanded the selectorate, thirteen happened while the party was in opposition. Clearly it plays some role but what these results suggest is that being in opposition and the loss of power are not in and of themselves causes of an expansion of selectorate rules. Rather they are situations produced by the large magnitude of defeat parties experience prior to expanding their selectorates. Defeat and opposition are possible and important, if not sufficient, conditions.

However, another measure of electoral loss does provide some

### Table 2
Descriptive statistics for independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats St. Deviation</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.1570</td>
<td>0.0916</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.4330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Seats St. Deviation</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.0819</td>
<td>0.0893</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>0.3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Regional Proportion</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.4645</td>
<td>0.1778</td>
<td>0.1428</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Opposition</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>44.7743</td>
<td>8.9276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Seats in Parliament</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.3243</td>
<td>0.1940</td>
<td>0.0068</td>
<td>0.7849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost Power</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.1701</td>
<td>0.3764</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.5591</td>
<td>0.4974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Result</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.1112</td>
<td>−0.5661</td>
<td>0.3830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>−1.3961</td>
<td>22.8446</td>
<td>−50</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Change</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.3993</td>
<td>0.4906</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3
Average regionalization values for selectorate changes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Seats St. Deviation</th>
<th>Weighted seats St. Deviation</th>
<th>Highest regional proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership selectorates expanded</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership selectorates remain the same</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4
Logistic regression for expansion of leadership selectorates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seats St. Dev.</td>
<td>6.436 (4.245)</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weighted Seats St. Dev.</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>8.101*** (4.660)</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Regional Proportion</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>−</td>
<td>5.003*** (2.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Opposition</td>
<td>−0.052 (0.070)</td>
<td>−0.076 (0.064)</td>
<td>−0.058 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>0.693 (0.963)</td>
<td>0.770 (0.932)</td>
<td>0.687 (0.981)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost Power</td>
<td>−0.925 (1.03)</td>
<td>−1.132 (1.052)</td>
<td>−0.922 (1.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Result</td>
<td>−5.484** (3.888)</td>
<td>−6.165** (3.829)</td>
<td>−4.805** (3.591)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Party</td>
<td>1.924 (1.201)</td>
<td>1.634* (1.210)</td>
<td>1.730* (1.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Seats in Parliament</td>
<td>−5.382*** (1.094)</td>
<td>−6.890*** (1.530)</td>
<td>−6.163*** (1.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merger</td>
<td>2.318** (1.156)</td>
<td>2.687** (1.409)</td>
<td>2.399** (1.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niche Party</td>
<td>−0.121 (0.999)</td>
<td>0.549 (1.316)</td>
<td>−0.630 (1.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>−0.012 (0.010)</td>
<td>−0.015 (0.014)</td>
<td>−0.004 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership Change</td>
<td>2.294* (1.003)</td>
<td>2.641*** (1.116)</td>
<td>2.487*** (1.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−4.493*** (1.157)</td>
<td>−4.495*** (1.055)</td>
<td>−6.171*** (1.522)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>−36.632</td>
<td>−36.054</td>
<td>−35.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>95.83%</td>
<td>95.14%</td>
<td>95.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>97.264</td>
<td>96.107</td>
<td>94.099</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates significance at $p = 0.10$ level, ** indicates significance at the $p = 0.05$ level, *** indicates significance at the $p = 0.01$ level, all one-tailed tests. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by party.
evidence for hypothesis two. The variable Election Result, which measures the change in size of a party's percentage of total seats, suggests that the more seats a party loses the more likely a party is to democratize its selectorate. This is not surprising, however, as it is most likely the case that when a party is reduced to their regional base in a country they would have lost a large number of seats. While losing a large number of seats increases the likelihood of a party democratizing their selectorate the lack of statistical significance for Opposition, Length of Opposition, and Lost Power indicates that poor elections results and losing power alone are not enough to force elites to share power (marginal effects plots C4–C7 show the impact of election results on selectorate expansion).

Other values of interest is the variable New Party, this suggests that when new parties form they are far more likely to begin with more democratic selectorates. This result is in line with the fourth hypothesis. The causes of this will need to be explored in further research, but it is highly possible that when a new party emerges into a political system they may attempt to differentiate themselves from the current parties as much as possible, which includes open selectorates. Another possible explanation is that new parties, unlike older established parties, do not have any supporters nor grassroots and so to quickly grow the party to be competitive with the current parties they give potential supporters as much power as possible.

The Leadership Change variable is statistically significant and positive. Parties are more likely to democratize their rules in the same electoral cycle in which they change their leaders. This suggests that selectorate expansion is a part of a larger effort at reinvention by the party, one that is changing both the face of the leadership as well as the process which selects it.

The variable for Percent Seats in Parliament is also statistically significant and negative. This indicates that the fewer seats in parliament a party holds the more likely they are to expand their selectorate. This is not surprising as it is very likely that when a party is reduced to just their regional base in a country they will likely have very few seats in Parliament. Again, marginal effect plots for this illustrate this point well (Figures C7–C9). The probability of expanding the leadership selectorate increases as the share of parliamentary seats drops below forty percent. This finding suggests, in line with the logic of the regionalization hypothesis, that parties are more likely to expand the scope of their leadership selectorates when they have suffered a magnitude of defeat that seriously limits their future prospects.

6. Conclusion

These results indicate that parties are pushed into democratizing their leadership selection process by large scale defeats which exclude large sections of the country, not merely opposition status or a more typical election defeat. As parties become more regionalized, they become more likely to expand their leadership selectorates. This finding explains the lack of expansion by New Zealand and Australia’s national parties and Fianna Fail in Ireland, each of which has generally performed evenly across the regions of their respective countries even when losing elections.

As Cross and Blais (2012a) found, new parties were more inclined to adopt more democratic rules. However, neither opposition status, time in opposition, nor losing power had a statistically significant effect on the expansion of selectorates. This is not to say that it plays no role; almost every case of expansion occurs when a party is in opposition. However, being in opposition is not in itself an impetus for rule change. Rather it is a natural part of the life of a political party. But losing large amounts of seats and being reduced to their regional base compels parties to change their leadership rules.

Recent developments seem to provide further evidence that regionalization plays some role. In 2013, the British Labour Party adopted a one-member-one-vote system for future leadership contests (Sparrow, 2013). This coincides with a time in which the party is the most regionalized it has been in nearly twenty years. In India, following its historic rout in the 2014 general election, several Congress party leaders raised the prospect of intraparty democratization after being reduced to a few pockets of support in the West and South (Satish, 2014).

These conclusions can be fairly generalized to the parties in Westminster systems but it is an open question whether or not they apply to other systems. Whether or not proportional systems such as those in Israel or presidential systems like the United States exhibit similar patterns remains to be seen. In addition, how these forces operate in developing democracies such as South Africa remains to be seen. Furthermore, there are real differences in leadership structures between consensus and Westminster democracies.

In consensus democracies, party leaders are often elected at conferences with regional delegates, it is questionable if regionalization would have much of an impact. With the roles of party leader and parliamentary leader often separated (Cross and Blais, 2012a), the link between regionalization and leadership election rules may be weakened. In short, these findings say much about leadership democratization in Westminster democracies, but do not necessarily say much about how regionalization affects leadership election rules in other democratic systems. However, these results provide an important first basis for the study of leadership democratization in these and other contexts. Future research should attempt to answer what impact regionalization might have on non-Westminster democracies.

This analysis presents a more nuanced conception of the decisions to expand leadership selection and provides a previously missing rationale for elites to make this decision. Political actors behave strategically and would be unlikely to surrender power if left to their own devices. However, situations arise where the loss of intra-party power may become necessary in order to ensure the attainment of governmental power. If the state of the party is such that it excludes too many voices such that it threatens the electoral viability of the party, the appeal of a rule change may increase in the eyes of party elites. Party elites are strategic actors. These findings shed some light on the strategic necessity behind selectorate expansion.

Appendix A. Parties

United Kingdom: Conservative, Labour, Liberal, Liberal Democrats, Social Democrats.

Canada: Conservative, Liberal, New Democrat, Progressive Conservative.


New Zealand: Labour, National.

Australia: Labor, Liberal, National.

Note: Regional parties such as the Bloc Québécois are excluded from our study; only nationwide parties that win seats in the national Parliament are included.

Appendix B. Regions

United Kingdom:

Canada:
Appendix C. Predicted Probability Plots

Fig. C1. Predicted Probability Plot, Seat Standard Deviation.

Fig. C2. Predicted Probability Plot, Weighted Seats Standard Deviation.

Fig. C3. Predicted Probability Plot, Highest Regional Proportion.

Fig. C4. Predicted Probability Plot, Election Result Change (Model 1).

Fig. C5. Predicted Probability Plot, Election Result Change (Model 2).

Fig. C6. Predicted Probability Plot, Election Result Change (Model 3).
Appendix D. Measure of Party Membership Change

One alternative hypothesis to explain why parties expand their selectorates that has not been tested is party membership totals. Party members provide parties with sources of votes, candidates, and funds. If a party observes that their supporters are leaving the party in droves then a logical move to entice those former supporters to rejoin the party is to expand the power of the rank and file, such as giving them a say in choosing the party’s leader (Scarrow, 1994; van Biezen et al., 2012). While this is a possibility we do not believe it has much merit. This is primarily due to party membership data we have access to. Party membership has been declining world-wide (and especially in countries such as Canada, the UK, and Australia). The inclusion of a variable such as changes in party membership would almost always be a negative value from one election to another. It is unlikely that any effect of membership change would be observed due to the near universal decline of membership of all parties.

Never the less, it is important to test this possible alternative hypothesis to rule it out. However, party membership totals are not publically available for all parties. Parties do not regularly report membership totals, and for many parties membership data is not made public at all. After an extensive search we were able to locate data on party membership for the main parties in the UK for every election, and Australia for most elections. Data could not be found for parties from Canada, Ireland, or New Zealand, however news stories and reports suggest that, much like the UK and Australia, membership has been declining for parties in these countries as well.

Even with this limited data on party membership, the analysis should be re-run with a variable for change in party membership. Due to the fact that we could only find membership data for two countries (and not for all parties or election cycles for these two countries) we cannot run our full model due to so few degrees of freedom. Instead, below is a simple model which lacks many control variables, but does include a variable for party membership change. To test the effect of membership change the table below replicates Model Table 4 in the text, but only as a bare-bones model.

As Table 5 shows, even with this new variable for membership change included the substantive results remain the same. Regionalization is still significant and contributes to parties changing their leadership selectorates, as does their total percentage in parliament. Changes in leadership from one election to another has no impact, meaning that when a party loses a large amount of members they are no more likely to expand their leadership selectorates than when they gain more members. This suggests that even if data on party membership from all the countries and all the parties in our study could be collected it still would not affect the overall result. Regionalization of a party, not membership decline, results in the expansion of leadership selectorates.

References

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